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 The limits of legislation as a product 
By Professor Helen Xanthaki1 
  
A. Introduction 
Legislative studies acquire an ever increasing focus in the limelight of better regulation and 
good governance. There is now an understanding that legislation is a means of communication 
from the government to the citizen. It is used as a tool of communicating what changes in 
behaviour, what new obligations, or what new rights are demanded or offered to citizens. In 
the pursuit for better legislative communication Parliaments and governments have applied 
plain language. The words used, the structure employed, and the placement of the new 
legislative text within the statute book have all been discussed to a degree. The question 
remains whether legislation, albeit good, can really achieve its legislative communication scope 
fully. 
This paper supports the view that legislation as a product has inherent limits. The paper 
identifies the main limits of legislation as a product to be its limited control over regulatory 
success, the limited scope of the means by which this success is achieved, the nature of 
legislation as a written text, and the instinctive aversion of citizens to legislative texts. The 
paper then proceeds to assess whether current legislative trends respond to these inherent limits 
and how. The paper concludes that the limits of legislation are unsurpassable but that current 
legislative responses to these limitations exacerbate the problem further. Alternatives are 
suggested, under the disclaimer that they may well be perceived as blue sky research rather 
than practically feasible options. At least for now. 
 
B. The limits of Legislation 
 
a. Legislation as a tool for regulation 
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 Legislation is simply a tool for regulation, namely a tool in the process of putting government 
policies into effect to the degree and extent intended by government.2 In other words, 
legislation is one of the many weapons3  in the arsenal of governments for the achievement of 
their desired regulatory results, which in turn is the prevalent measure of policy success.4 The 
regulatory tools available to government vary5 from flexible forms of traditional regulation 
(such as performance-based and incentive approaches), to co-regulation and self-regulation 
schemes6, incentive and market based instruments (such as tax breaks and tradable permits) 
and information approaches.7 But legislation remains one of the most popular regulatory tools. 
 So what is legislation attempting to achieve and by what means? The diagram8 below 
visualises these goals and their hierarchy.9 
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 Starting with efficacy, this is the extent to which regulators achieve their goal.10 The term is 
often used interchangeably with effectiveness, especially by experts outside the field of 
legislative studies.11 But the concept of the main regulatory goal remains the achievement of 
the desired regulatory results. However, achieving the desired regulatory results is not a goal 
that can be achieved by the drafter alone12: legislation requires a solid policy, appropriate and 
realistic policy measures for its achievement, cost efficient mechanisms of implementation, 
and ultimately user willingness to implement and judicial inclination to interpret according to 
legislative intent.13  
 The drafter’s limited possible contribution to efficacy is effectiveness14, defined as the 
extent to which the observable attitudes and behaviours of the target population correspond to 
the attitudes and behaviours prescribed by the legislator15; or “the fact that law matters: it has 
effects on political, economic and social life outside the law – that it, apart from simply the 
elaboration of legal doctrine”16; or a term encompassing implementation, enforcement, impact, 
and compliance17; or the degree to which the legislative measure has achieved a concrete goal 
without suffering from side effects18; or the extent to which the legislation influences in the 
desired manner the social phenomenon which it aims to address19; or a consequence of the rule 
of law, which imposes a duty on the legislator to consider and respect the implementation and 
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 enforcement of legislation to be enacted20; or a measure of the causal relations between the law 
and its effects: and so an effective law is one that is respected or implemented, provided that 
the observable degree of respect can be attributed to the norm.21 If one attempts to use all of 
the elements of these enlightened definitions of effectiveness, one could suggest that 
effectiveness of legislation is the ultimate measure of quality in legislation22, which reflects the 
extent to which the legislation manages to introduce adequate mechanisms capable of 
producing the desired regulatory results.23 In its concrete, rather than abstract conceptual sense, 
effectiveness requires a legislative text that can (i) foresee the main projected outcomes and 
use them in the drafting and formulation process; (ii) state clearly its objectives and purpose; 
(iii) provide for necessary and appropriate means and enforcement measures; (iv) assess and 
evaluate real-life effectiveness in a consistent and timely manner.24 
 And so this is the first and main inherent limit of legislation. As a mere expression of 
the regulatory agenda, legislation inevitably relies on the soundness of the policy goals and 
regulatory aims set by regulators.  Legislation requires a constitutionally, legally, ethically, and 
democratic (in the sense of acceptable by the majority) policy aim pursued by equally 
constitutional, legal, ethical, democratic, and cost efficient means to achieve it. Moreover, it 
relies on the intent of users and interpreters to comply with it. Of course, this interdependence 
of policy, regulation, legislation, and implementation works both ways: good legislative 
expression can accentuate the logic of the policy, can clarify the choice of regulatory tools, and 
can ultimately incite implementation. But in the same way that efficacy requires legislative 
facilitation of regulatory success, it also requires the synergistic contribution of all parts and 
actors of the drafting process as part of the legislative process, which in turn is part of the policy 
process.25     
b. Legislation as written communication  
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 Added to the lack of its ultimate control over efficacy, legislation is further limited by the 
means by which it can pursue efficacy. The diagram above expresses that effectiveness can be 
achieved by means of clarity, precision, and unambiguity. And that these can be enhanced by 
the use of plain language and gender neutral language. Legislation aims to communicate26 the 
regulatory message to its users as a means of imposing and inciting implementation. It attempts 
to detail clearly, precisely, and unambiguously what the new obligations or the new rights can 
be, in order to inform citizens with an inclination to comply how their behaviour or actions 
must change from the legislation’s entry into force. The receipt of the legislative message in 
the way that it was sent by the legislative text is crucial for its effectiveness and, ultimately, for 
the efficacy of the regulation that the text expresses. 
 Plain language aims to introduce principles that convey the legislative/regulatory 
message in a manner that it clear and effective for its audience.  Plain language encompasses 
all aspects of written communication: words, syntax, punctuation, the structure of the 
legislative text, its layout on paper and screen, and the architecture of the whole statute book 
as a means of facilitating awareness of the interconnections between texts. And so plain 
language begins to kick in during the analysis of the policy and the initial translation into 
legislation, with the selection and prioritization of the information that readers need to receive. 
It continues with choices related to structure during the selection and design of the legislative 
solution, with simplification of the policy, simplification of the legal concepts involved in 
putting the policy to effect, and initial plain language choices of legislative expression (for 
example, a decision for direct textual amendments combined by a Keeling schedule, or a repeal 
and re-enactment when possible). Plain language enters very much into the agenda during the 
composition of the legislative text. And remains in the cards during the text verification, where 
additional confirmation of appropriate layout and visually appeal come into play. And so plain 
language extends from policy to law to drafting. The existing concept of plain language relates 
to a holistic approach to legislation as a text, as a printed or electronic image, and as part of the 
statute book. 
 But the blessing of this ambitious mandate constitutes the weakness (or is it limit?) of 
plain language as a main contributor to clarity, precision, unambiguity, effectiveness, and 
ultimately efficacy. Plain language cannot be distilled to the set of rules that must always be 
followed: the rules are relative and directly affected by the precise audience of the specific 
legislative communication: mens rea is easily understood by a legal audience but of course it 
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 is an unfamiliar term to audiences without legal sophistication. The relativity of plain language 
is expressed by the recent replacement of objective simplification as its goal with the more 
subjective easification.27 Easification requires simplification of the text for its specific 
audience, and thus requires an awareness of who the users of the texts will be, and what kind 
of sophistication they possess. 
 Answers to these questions were simply not present for legislation until very recently. 
It was widely accepted that legislative communication involved the drafter (who, at least in the 
UK, is a trained lawyer with drafting training and experience) and the generic user (who can 
be anything from a senior judge to an illiterate citizen of below average capacity). The 
inequality in the understanding of both common terms (whichever they may be) and legal terms 
renders communication via a single text a hopeless task. And this is precisely the second limit 
of legislation: communication from a trained and highly experienced lawyer to a wide circle of 
possible audiences with vast diversion of general and legal sophistication is simply an 
impossible task. Much more so if this is attempted by means of a single written text. This 
deprives the communication sender from the opportunity to gauge reception and make amends 
by means of further clarification where needed, or by means of intonation or even gestures that 
are simply not available in written communication. 
 It is this inherent limit of legislation that has led to the supplementing of the legislative 
text by policy guidance, explanatory materials, and annotations. What these fail to take into 
account though is the change in user attitudes: at a time where users are used to using the 
internet to receive direct answers from the original sources of communication instead of relying 
on intermediary professionals, legislation is used as a direct source of answers to questions 
related to the text. This is proven by the 2,000,000 users per month of the UK government’s 
free electronic legal database. But more about this a bit later. For now, it suffices to identify 
the second limit of legislation, its presentation in the form of written communication.  
 
c. The intrinsic aversion of users to legislative texts28 
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 The last limit of legislation relates to a phenomenon observed and recorded by the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel: users’ aversion to legislation. This takes the form of perceptions of 
over-complexity or negative perceptions. The OPC is not unique in identifying this as an issue: 
the basis of the plain language movement lies with legislative complexity with reference to 
words, structure, and placement within the architecture of the statute book. 
 In other words, users of diverse legal sophistication are overwhelmed by the volume 
and complexity of legislation. They find it difficult to understand the terminology used with 
the text, the structure of the Act itself, and the interconnection of the Act with other primary 
and secondary legislative texts and the statute book as a whole. What users find intimidating is 
not just the words themselves (one could argue that the simplification of words has come a 
very long way) but the context of the legislative message within the many provisions of the 
same Act, and within the labyrinth of relevant primary and secondary sources of law.  
 Negative perception of legislation describes the phenomenon of citizens’ attribution of 
more complexity to legislation than it actually is. Navigation between pieces of legislation is 
often the problem. Users also appear to find it difficult to find reliable explanatory information 
and relevant guidance. 
 This is the third limit of legislation: it is an inherent living and ever evolving organism 
of complexity whose understanding requires context, both conceptual and historical. In other 
words, legislation needs to be accessible in a manner that allows the user to understand what 
the law (rather than the specific legislative text) is, at any given moment in time. 
 
C. Current legislative trends and the limits of legislation 
One could argue, rather persuasively, that these are unsurpassable limits of legislative texts. 
They form part of the characteristics of legislation as a product. And one could resign to their 
prevalence. But that would means resigning to the ineffectiveness of legislation, or its 
inappropriateness as a regulatory tool. This could not be further from the truth. Having 
identified its measure of excellent, and the means by which legislation can achieve it, the study 
of legislation must now turn to its weakness and an assessment of a method that can reduce the 
effect of these inherent limits. Until very recently, this was impossible. What can facilitate 
 communication is the identification of the possible precise users of the specific legislative text: 
identifying who the users of the text will be allows the text to ‘speak’ to them in a language 
that tends to be understood by them. Until now identifying the users was a hypothetical and 
rather academic exercise. Recent empirical data offered by a revolutionary survey of The 
National Archives in cooperation with the Office of Parliamentary Counsel have provided 
much needed answers.  The survey of 2,000,000 samples of users of www.legislation.gov.uk 
has identified at least three categories of users of legislation: lay persons reading the legislation 
to make it work for them , sophisticated non -lawyers using the law in the process of their 
professional activities, and lawyers and judges. In more detail in the UK there are three 
categories of users of legislation:  
a. Non-lawyers who needs to use legislation for work, such as law enforcers, 
human resources professionals, or local council officials; the ‘Mark Green’ of the survey 
represents about 60% of users of legislation; 
b. Lay persons who seeks answers to questions related to their personal or familial 
situation; ‘Heather Cole’ represents about 20% of users of legislation; and  
c. Lawyers, judges, and senior law librarians; the ‘Jane Booker’ persona represents 
about 20% of users of legislation.    
The significance of the survey cannot be understated. The survey, whose data relate to users of 
electronic versions of the free government database of legislation only, destroys the myth that 
legislation is for legal professionals alone. In fact, legal professionals are very much in the 
minority of users, although their precise percentage may well be affected by their tendency to 
use subscription databases rather than the government database, which is not annotated and 
often not updated. Whatever the exact percentages of each category are, there is significant 
empirical evidence that in the UK legislation speaks to three distinct groups of users, whose 
legal awareness varies from none, to some, to expert. But is the legal awareness of the users 
the only parameter for plain language as a means of effective legislative communication?  
Pitching the legislative text to the ‘right’ level requires an additional consideration. 
Having realised which are the rough profiles of the audience, the next parameter for plain 
communication is the topic of the legislative text. Legislative texts are not all aimed at the same 
readers.  Their primary audience varies. For example, the main users of rules of evidence the 
 drafter are probably judges and lawyers.  So the language and terminology used can be 
sophisticated: paraphrasing the term ‘intent’ with a plain language equivalent such as ‘meaning 
to’ would lead the primarily legal audience to the legitimate assumption that the legislation 
means something other than ‘intent’ and would not easily carry the interpretative case-law of 
‘intent’ on to ‘meaning to’. And so rules of evidence can be drafted in specialist language, 
albeit with a caveat: a primarily legally sophisticated audience cannot serve as a ‘carte blanche’ 
for legalese, since non-lawyers may need to, and in any case must, have access to the legislation 
too. As audiences become more specialized and more educated in technical areas, they expect 
texts that are targeted to their particular needs.  Moreover, since accessibility of legislation is 
directly linked to Bingham’s rule of law, passing inaccessible legislation under the feeble 
excuse that its primary audience possesses legal sophistication is not easily acceptable. And so 
there is an argument for either the continued use of legal terminology or for the provision of a 
definition of the new plain language equivalent referring to the legal term used until now.   
But how ‘plain’ must legislation be? Even within the ‘Heather Cole’ persona there is 
plenty of diversity. There is a given commonality in the lack of legal training, but the 
sophistication, general and legal, of Heather Coles can range from a fiercely intelligent and 
generally sophisticated user to a rather naïve, perhaps illiterate, and even intellectually 
challenged individual. Which of those Heather Coles is the legislation speaking to? It certainly 
is not the commonly described as ‘the average man on the street’. To start with, there are also 
women on our streets, and they are users of legislation too. And then, why are the above or 
below averages amongst us excluded from legislative communication? Since effectiveness is 
the goal of legislative texts, should legislation not speak to each and every user who falls within 
the subjects of the policy solution expressed by this specific legislative text? This includes the 
above average, the average, and the below average people.   
This is a rather revolutionary innovation. Identifying the users of legislation has led to 
not one but two earthquakes in legislative studies: yes, the law does not speak to lawyers alone; 
but the law does not speak to the traditional plain language ‘average man’. If applied in practice, 
this new knowledge will change the way in which legislation is drafted. First, legislative 
language can no longer be gauged at legal and regulatory professionals. Although great 
advances have already taken place, legislation now tends to be pitched to ‘Mark Green’: further 
simplification to the benefit of ‘Heather Cole’ needs to take place with immediate effect. The 
Office of Parliamentary Counsel are working on this: for example, the term ‘long title’ referring 
 to the provision starting with ‘An Act to…’  is now replaced by the term ‘introductory text’ as 
standard in the tables of arrangement found on all Acts in www.legislation.gov.uk. Similarly, 
there is talk of switching from ‘commencement’ to ‘start date’, as user testing has shown that 
commencement is puzzling to non-lawyers. The Guidance to drafting legislation reflects the 
UK government’s commitment to legislating in a user friendly manner. 
But more can be done. It is time to look at legislation with an innovative lens in order 
to identify initiatives that can address its inherent limits. 
 
D. Alternatives: delimit the limits 
 
Having established the concept of effectiveness as synonymous to good legislation, and the 
new holistic mandate of plain language in legislation, and armed with the new empirical data 
offered by TNA and OPC, let us discuss further possibilities. I have identified three blue sky 
mechanisms for better law. They respond to the limits of legislation: the layered structure 
promotes a three tier structure for legislative texts each addressed to each of the three user 
groups; the typography inspired presentation and layout responds to the need to bring to light 
the main regulatory messages in legislation; and the interactive electronic statute book 
highlights the interconnectivity between legislative texts within the statute book as a whole.      
  
a. The layered approach to structure  
Currently legislative texts are structured in application to Lord Thring’s Five Rules of 
Drafting29 that offers precedence to provisions declaring the law versus provisions relating to 
the administration of the law; to simpler versus the more complex proposition; and to principal 
versus subordinate provisions. Exceptional, temporary, and provisions relating to the repeal of 
Acts, and procedure and matters of detail should be set apart. But there is much scope for blue 
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 sky innovation by use of the layered approach30. The rationale behind the modern approach lies 
with the logical sequence of provisions within the text, which reflects logic, and philosophical 
and linguistic approaches to language and thought. This basis has now been overcome by the 
crucial evidence on the three user groups for legislation. Heather Cole, Mark Greene, and Jane 
Booker are diverse users that require diverse pitches of the legislative text. Speaking to all three 
of them at the same time is a rather complex, for some impossible, task. Introducing three 
versions of the same legislative text is a possibility but it is a recipe for disaster on such a 
diverse range of grounds, moral, ethical, constitutional, practical: rule of law, issues of 
interpretation between versions, identifying which version corresponds to each user, using that 
version as opposed to the one selected by the user, who subjects each user to their 
corresponding persona, ethical and moral consequences of the application of a diverse version 
for each user. And the parallel existence of three different texts could be counter-productive: 
users currently choose to use the complex but official legislative text over any of the many 
interpretation aids offered by government. If the plethora of attractive user friendly manuals 
and policy documents are shunned in favour of legislative texts, what makes it probable that 
users will go to the simple Heather Cole text as opposed to the legal Jane Booker one that 
reflects users’ perception of legislation? And so remaining with a single text is really the only 
option. But this is exactly what has imprisoned legislative drafters in the struggle for simplicity 
within legislative texts.   
It is now possible to see that each user group has its individual requirements for 
legislative information that are distinct from those of the other user groups. Identifying the 
needs for legislative information for each user group at a provision, rather than text, level would 
allow drafters to imitate oral communication, and pitch the legislative text to specific abilities 
and requirements. Drafters of legislative texts can now begin to think what regulatory or legal 
message is relevant to each group, and structure the text accordingly.   
The layered approach promotes the division of legislation into three parts, 
corresponding to each of the three profiles of legislative users. Part 1 can speak to lay persons: 
the content is limited to the main regulatory messages, thus conveying the essence of law 
reform attempted by the legislation, focusing gravely on the information that lay persons need 
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 in order to become aware of a new regulation, to comply with new obligations, or to enjoy new 
rights. Part 2 can speak to non-legally trained professionals who use the legislation in the course 
of their employment. Here one can see scope for further detail in the regulatory messages 
introduced, and for language that is balanced [technical, yet approachable to the professionals 
in question]. Part 3 of the legislation can then deal with issues of legislative interpretation, 
issues of procedure, and issues of application, in a language that is complex but not quite 
legalese, as there is nothing to prevent all groups from reading all parts.  
The layered approach is revolutionary, as it shifts the criterion for legislative structure 
from the content and nature of provisions to the profile of the users. It switches on a user-
centred structure, thus promoting both a link between policy and its effecting legislative text 
but also enhancing and personalising the channel of communication between drafters and users. 
And it applies and reflects the modern doctrine of contextualism in language and philosophy. 
But it cannot be viewed as a complete departure from tradition, as it continues to apply Lord 
Thring’s five rules. By requiring that Part 1 includes the primary regulatory message, it 
promotes Lord Thring’s rules that give precedence to the simpler proposition. And by 
structuring legislation into three parts, the layered approach complies with the other Thing rules 
that require division of provisions declaring the law [in Part 1 or 2] with provisions 
administrating the law [in Part 2 or 3 accordingly]; that principal provisions should be separated 
from subordinate [in Parts 1 and 2]; that exceptional, temporary, and provisions relating to the 
repeal of Acts should be separated from the other enactments, and placed by themselves under 
separate headings [in Part 3]; and that procedure and matters of detail should be set apart by 
themselves [either in Part 3 of the layered approach, or in a Schedule].  
The layered approach seems to be one of the promising initiatives in the field of 
legislation. But there are three points that need to be clarified. First, the layered approach may, 
but will not necessarily, lead to a partial, fragmented, or incomplete legislative communication 
to Heather Cole. There is no doubt that an erroneous application of the approach could result 
to that. But the placement of the main messages in Part 1 per se must be seen as an added bonus 
to lay users compared with the current state of affairs: in the layered approach the now 
frequently elusive main regulatory message will be easily identified, will be brought forward 
in a pronounced place at the beginning of the legislative text, and will be expressed in a 
language that is accessible to lay users. Compared to the current state of affairs, where the main 
message is communicated somewhere within the legislative text and is expressed in the layered 
 approach’s Part 2 or 3 language, this is certainly an improvement. And of course, there is 
nothing preventing Heather Cole from reading the rest of the text: in fact, an inviting Part 1 can 
only encourage Heather Cole to keep reading, whilst offering her a clear context within which 
her understanding of complex and detailed messages can only be enhanced.  
Second, although Part 1 carrying the main regulatory message is distinctly different 
from Parts 2 and 3, it may be unclear what really distinguishes between Part 2 data and Part 3 
data: both Mark Green and Jane Booker are able to handle complexity and technicality of 
legislative data. However, they do not both require the same data, as demonstrated by their 
motives when using www.legislation.gov.uk: Mark Green is interested in answers that allow 
him to perform his professional but non-legal duties, whereas Jane Booker seeks legal 
information. As a result, what Mark Green needs is a clear understanding of substantive and 
procedural requirements imposed by the legislation, whereas Jane Booker seeks deeper 
statutory interpretation often coupled with a holistic view of the statute book. As a result, Part 
2 of the layered approach involves answers to questions such as who must do what by when, 
and what happens if they don’t. Part 3 will delve deeper into intricate distinctions and possible 
exceptions that relate to statutory interpretation and interconnections between legislative texts 
within the statute book. There are two caveats here. One, Mark Green must still read the text 
as a whole. And Part 3 cannot be viewed as a mere shell of definitions, repeals, and 
consequential amendments: this would deprive the readers from at least part of the benefits of 
the layered approach.   
Third, it would be inappropriate to consider that the simplification serviced by the 
layered approach would result to an abolition of the need for explanatory materials for 
legislation. In fact, as the layered approach results in an inherent fragmentation of data, it 
renders the use of explanatory materials and notes reinstating the fluidity of information and 
the cross-fertilisation between parts an ever so crucial requirement. The new style of 
explanatory notes31 introduced by Good Law and showcased in the Armed Forces (Service 
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 Complaints and Financial Assistance) Bill [HL] Explanatory Notes32 enhance the layered 
approach by introducing a clear table of contents that is thematic rather than provision based, 
with information on the policy and legal context of the Act, and with simple narratives on the 
main regulatory messages for all three user groups.33   
  Ultimately, the proof of the layered approach is in its application. User testing can prove 
whether it works, which user group for, and how it can be amended or fine-tuned to serve users 
better.   
 
b. Legislative image: presentation, layout, pictures  
  
Looking now in the image of the legislative text, namely at the picture that the user receives 
when looking at the text, it is necessary to distinguish between paper and electronic. It is 
noteworthy that in New Zealand legislation is only published electronically: paper publication 
ceased last year. In the UK I am not aware of government intent to abolish paper publication 
or even the tradition of vellum.  
Plain language has always advocated the need to rethink the layout of legislative texts.34 
The single font, the lack of adequate contrast between paper and text, the unique format are 
elements of the current legislative image that prevent the user from identifying the important 
aspects of the regulatory message thus reducing readability of legislative texts. Legislative 
texts attempt to convey a ‘legislative story’ to the user, thus allowing them to identify and then 
understand the underlying policy, the legislative choices made, and the rationale behind the 
text. This offers them the ability to read and interpret the text in context, thus making 
accessibility easier and more secure.   
The importance of layout has been the main motivation behind the change of legislative 
layout in the UK in 2001. The current layout shows more white space and a slight change of 
                                                 
32 See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/377467/new-
formatexplanatory-notes.pdf.   
33 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2014-2015/0003/en/15003en.htm.   
34 See Office of Scottish Parliamentary Counsel, ‘Plain language and legislation’, February 2006, 
http://www.gov.scot/resource/doc/93488/0022476.pdf.   
 font coupled with shorter sections and sentences; structure in parts and sections, headings, and 
the new table of contents [previously known as the table of arrangements] are all tools that 
promote clearer layout for the purposes of enhancing readability. Specific demonstrations of 
the modern layout are observed in a number of Acts: the ‘step by step’ approach to setting out 
a series of complex rules in section 91 of the Income Tax Act 2007; the tables in section 181 
of the Finance Act 2013; the headings for subsections in section 2 of the National Insurance 
Contributions Act 2014.35  
However, there is plenty of scope for further progress. Within the remit of Good Law, 
the use of typography tools has been discussed and tested amongst experts. Rob Waller of the 
Simplification Centre presented before and after images of legislative text with text presented 
in different fonts, in frames, in colour. The Waller layout involves reduced punctuation and 
simplified numbering; bold terms and horizontal rules to show the structure; a solution to the 
problem of ‘and’ and ‘or’ relationships; and framed text showing amendments to other Acts.36  
Layout is now at the forefront of practitioners’ agenda. And quite rightly so. It has been 
overlooked and there is great scope for change. However, layout alone cannot respond to a 
complex text, to a complex regulatory message, or indeed to a complex policy. It will 
contribute to simplification but with the aid of additional visual tools.  
One of those tools that have been ignored by even the most visionary of legislative 
academics and practitioners is the use of image in legislation. Images have been used in 
legislation that introduces national flags, traffic signs, or planning regulations. But the 
relationship between picture and legislation has not been explored fully. The visual arts could 
play a significant role here: there is nothing more direct, relevant to a wide range of users, and 
time resistant than Cain swinging his club above the prostrate Abel in Titian’s painting in Santa 
Maria della Salute in Venice. The visual representations of themes relating to wrongdoing are 
so emotionally charged and the characters shown in such magnification that, combined with 
beauty and other aesthetic values, picture has had tremendous impact on the viewer.  
                                                 
35 See H. Rogers ‘Good Law: how can the design of Bills and Acts help?’ in Design Commission, Designing 
Democracy: how designers are changing democracy – spaces and processes, An Inquiry of the Design  
Commission, March 2015, 
http://www.policyconnect.org.uk/apdig/sites/site_apdig/files/report/497/fieldreportdownload/designingdemocrac 
yinquiry.pdf, 56.  
36 See R. Waller, ‘Layout for Legislation’, Technical Paper 15, www.simplificationcentre.org.uk/resources/ 
technical-papers/.  
 Perhaps the inclusion of images in legislation can enhance the quality of 
communication. An example could be drawn from criminal provisions. The picture 
accompanying the legislation in the form of a Schedule may show:   
  
• what behaviour is to be condemned (show the action; and specify if the person knows 
that this is bad, suspects that this is bad, or is ignorant of the badness of the behaviour); 
and   
• that this is an offence (for example show a stop sign or show societal disapproval); and  
• that it carries a sanction (for example show the penalty and its adverse effect).  
  
The use of typographical and visual aids in legislation can enhance readability37 
immensely. They can address textual limitations and can take the user further by banishing  
the barriers or written textual communication. User testing is the only way to assess if and how 
useful they are. But academic research, indeed inter-disciplinary academic research, is the only 
forum for analysis at a theoretical level first, and then in application to actual legislation.    
  
c. The statute book as a whole  
 Reforming the structure and layout of individual legislative texts may bear little fruit without 
changes in the statute book as a whole. Addressing the issue of legislative volume that enhances 
complexity38 has been at the forefront of the agendas of the last two governments as the 
epicentre of regulatory quality. The volume of legislation came under review in 2003. The 
Better Regulation Task Force’s ‘Principles of Good Regulation’77 linked better regulation with 
less legislation, and offered a number of regulatory alternatives: do nothing; advertising 
campaigns and education; using the market; financial incentives; self-regulation and voluntary 
codes of practice; and prescriptive regulation. In ‘The Coalition: our programme for 
                                                 
37 See G. Jones, P. Rice, J. Sherwood, J. Whiting ‘Developing a Tax Complexity Index for the UK’, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/285944/OTS_Developing_a_Tax 
_Complexity_Index_for_the_UK.pdf.   
38 See Office of Parliamentary Counsel ‘When Laws Become Too Complex: A review into the causes of 
complex legislation, March 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/187015/GoodLaw_report_8April 
_AP.pdf, 6-7. 77 See 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407162704/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/upload/asset
s /www.brc.gov.uk/principlesleaflet.pdf.   
 government’39 the previous government undertook to cut red tape40 by introducing a ‘one-in, 
one-out’ rule whereby no new regulation is brought in without other regulation being cut by a 
greater amount;41 and to impose sunset clauses on regulations; and to give the public the 
opportunity to challenge the worst regulations. Such was the importance attributed to 
legislative volume that the Prime Minister in his letter of 6 April 2011 to all Cabinet Ministers 
declared:   
‘I want us to be the first Government in modern history to leave office having reduced the 
overall burden of regulation, rather than increasing it.’  
In order to achieve this aim, the UK government went one step further and introduced a one-
in two-out approach. It undertook to use regulation for the achievement of its policy objectives 
only where non-regulatory approaches cannot lead to satisfactory outcomes; cost benefits 
analysis demonstrates a clear margin of superiority of regulation to alternative, self-regulatory, 
or non-regulatory approaches; or the regulation and the enforcement framework can be 
implemented in a fashion which is demonstrably proportionate; accountable; consistent; 
transparent and targeted.42 The number of Acts passed in 2012 was only 20 with a total number 
of pages of 1,88643: this was a new low after the peak of the late 1990s and early 2000s. But, 
whilst the number of Acts has decreased since the 1980s, the mean average number of pages 
per Act has increased significantly, from 37 and 47 pages during the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively, to 85 in the past decade; if one compares these numbers with the 1950s when the 
average was 16, a trend of fewer but longer Acts becomes evident.44 One could contribute this 
increase to plain language drafting and to the increasing amounts of white space and bigger 
margins leading to 20% fewer words on a page.45 However, there is a crucial contributing 
                                                 
39 See ‘The Coalition: our programme for government’,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_programme_for_ 
government.pdf.   
40 For further information on the Red Tape Challenge, see 
http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/home/index.  
41 http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/docs/o/11-671-one-in-one-out-methodology.  
42 See Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Better Regulation Framework Manual’, July 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/211981/bis-13-1038-
betterregulation-framework-manual-guidance-for-officials.pdf, 4.  
43 See HoL Library Note 2013/008, Volume of Legislation, 4.  
44 See HoL Library Note, Volume of Legislation, LLN 2011/028, September 2011.  
45 See R. Heaton, House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee ‘Ensuring standards in the 
quality of legislation’ First Report of Session 2013–14, HC 85 Incorporating HC 74-i to vii, Session 2012-13, 20 
May 2013, Question 64.  
 factor: over the last 30-40 years the number of Statutory Instruments has steadily increased.46 
And so the volume of legislation, including primary and delegated, seems to be fighting its 
ground in practice.47   
Nonetheless, the UK has been very active in the field of regulatory reform. This is 
evidenced by a recent OECD Review, which pronounces the regulatory reforms in the UK as 
impressive.48 Points of excellence include the effective balance between policy breadth and 
the stock and the flow of regulation; and the extensive application of EU’s Better Regulation 
initiatives in the UK49.  
But of course innovations to the statute book do not end with legislative volume. Blue sky 
proposals, which in this case may be put to effect much quicker than one might expect, include 
the current work of The National Archives. John Sheridan leads current thinking both at the 
theoretical level of viewing the statute book as a collection of big data, and at the application 
level of presenting a prototype of a radically reformed screen presenting legislation at 
www.legislation.gov.uk. Our Big Data in Law project50 revolutionized the way in which the 
statute book is viewed and led to big data applications and capabilities to UK legislation as a 
coherent, interrelated, and up to date whole. The project created a search mechanism for 
researchers allowing them to instigate research on legislation as a body: from the census that 
allows counting for example the number of ‘shall’ in UK legislation throughout the years to 
the introduction of methodology tools that provide empirical data on aspects of the statute book 
or the whole of the statute book.51 This entirely new and free resource for the research 
community offers pre-packaged analyses of the data, new open data from closed data, and 
creates the capability of identifying pattern language for legislation, which would encapsulate 
commonly occurring legislative solutions to commonly occurring problems thus facilitating 
legislative communication. The project, which has just concluded, enhances user [in this case 
                                                 
46 See R. Cracknell and R. Clements ‘Acts and Statutory Instruments: the volume of UK legislation 1950 to 
2012’ HoC Standard Note SN/SG/2911, 15 November 2012, 2.  
47 And not just in the UK: see R. Pagano Introduzione alla legistica – L’arte di preparare le leggi (Milano, 
Giuffre, 1999) 6.  
48 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/60/44912018.pdf.   
49 For a listing of such policies and their implementation in the UK, see 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/bre/improving-eu-regulation/guiding-principles-eu-legislation.  
50 The project team was led by John Sheridan, TNA, as Principal Investigator; D. Howarth, University of 
Cambridge, and Prof. Helen Xanthaki, Sir William Dale Centre, were Co-Investigators; the Advisory Board was 
chaired by Sir Stephen Laws, KCB, QC, LLD former First Parliamentary Counsel.  
51 http://tna.bunnyfoot.com/LDRI/#p=home.   
 researchers’] understanding of the interrelations and interconnections between legislative texts, 
within fields of law, and across fields of law.  
The project feeds into the great efforts led by The National Archives to review the way in 
which legislation is ‘served’ to users by offering unprecedented capabilities of identifying 
relevant legislative texts, such as delegated legislation, cross referenced texts, definitions of 
terms used in a legislative text, and, in the long term, even case-law clarifying or applying the 
text to cases. There are already two prototypes of the new screen for legislation. Both have 
been tested in user testing undertaken by BunnyFoot and including iris trackers as a means of 
assessing how long a user’s eye spends in each part of the text, where the eye is searching for 
further information and where on the screen, and where the user fails to understand the text or 
the cross reference completely. This work is of profound importance. What is missing for the 
purposes of legislative readability is context, and this is what the new screen can provide. This, 
along with the new format of explanatory notes, can finally offer the user an accurate picture 
of the labyrinth of legislative data in all their complexity and cross-wiring. Would this facilitate 
the user? Of course it will: it will depict an accurate image of legislative regulation on the topic 
searched, thus demonstrating if clear answers can be found or if it is time for the user to accept 
that statutory interpretation by a trained legal professional is what is really needed in that case.       
  
D. Conclusions  
This paper set out to prove that legislation as a product suffers from inherent limits. First, even 
effective legislation can only contribute, rather than lead, to regulatory success: as a result, 
legislation’s success is not in its own hands, at least not fully. Second, the means by which this 
limited contribution to its own success can be achieved suffer from their own inherent 
limitations: communicating the regulatory message effectively is almost impossible due to the 
great gap between the legal sophistication of drafter and user, but mainly due to the great 
unknown that is the concrete membership of the legislative audience and its multiple levels of 
legal sophistication; and this great difficulty is only accentuated by the nature of legislation as 
a mere written text. Third, legislation has a reputation: negative perceptions and perceptions of 
over-complexity lead to the users’ aversion to legislation. 
 These limits are inherent and seem unsurpassable. Does this signify an end to the use 
of legislation as a successful regulatory tool? Far from it. A breakthrough in the identification 
of the membership of legislative audiences in the UK has unlocked the key to unknown 
 parameters that create legislation’s limits. A recent study of legislative users in the UK has 
shown that there are mainly three type of users with varied common and legal sophistication 
that seek answers to diverse questions from the legislative text. Lay users seek to understand 
the main regulatory message and apply it to the particular circumstances of themselves or their 
family. Non-legal professionals seek to understand how the regulatory reform affects the 
performance of their professional duties and how to administer the regulatory reform. And legal 
professionals seek to understand the intricate messages that respond to queries of statutory 
interpretation and to place the specific piece of legislation within the architecture of the statute 
book. This is the key to legislative limits. 
 First, the structure of the legislative text can be liberated from the restraints of a text-
centred prioritisation of regulatory messages: a user centred layered approach can lead the 
drafter to address the main regulatory issues that are relevant to lay users in Part 1 placing the 
text in context and using a totally unsophisticated objectively plain language; specific 
regulatory messages and administrative issues can be placed in Part 2 that speaks to non-legal 
professionals in an easified language; and issues of statutory interpretation and text 
contextualisation can be addressed in Part 3 in a language as legally sophisticated as required.  
Second, the layout of legislation can focus the user’s mind to the main messages, can refer the 
user to relevant context within the text and even outside it. Visualisation of messages can 
surpass the limit of legislation as a form of written communication. And third, the concept of 
legislation as data can lead to the provision of information from outside the text and within the 
statute book as a means of offering the user a global understanding of what the law, rather than 
the legislative text, is at their relevant moment in time. 
 These innovative tools, all stemming from the newly acquired revelation of who reads 
legislation and why, can strengthen plain language as a tool for achieving legislation that is 
viewed within the context of regulatory efficacy. Will this make legislation limitless? Of course 
not. But it certainly is worth a try! 
